Michigan Journal of International Law
Volume 41

Issue 2

2020

Fixing the Problem of Incompetent Defense Counsel Before the
International Criminal Court
Matthew Catallo
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil
Part of the Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the
Organizations Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Matthew Catallo, Fixing the Problem of Incompetent Defense Counsel Before the International Criminal
Court, 41 MICH. J. INT'L L. 417 (2020).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol41/iss2/5

https://doi.org/10.36642/mjil.41.2.fixing
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

FIXING THE PROBLEM OF INCOMPETENT
DEFENSE COUNSEL BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Matthew Catallo*

I. Introduction: The Trajectory of
International Criminal Law
Since the establishment of the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals, the international order has searched for an adjudicatory mechanism to penalize
humanity’s worst offenders consistent with modern notions of procedural
1
equity. The international order strives to do so by processing the accused
through a system respectful of the fundamental due process rights priori2
tized by most modern societies. While the evolution of substantive international criminal law is certainly a cause for celebration, these procedural developments are equally deserving of praise. The procedural law—which is
derived from identified human rights norms—ensures that the substantive
criminal code can be applied with fairness and integrity, and, by doing so,
3
gives legitimacy to the imposition of international criminal law. This legitimacy, however, depends on the system’s ability to adequately safeguard the
right to competent defense counsel.

*
Notes Editor, Michigan Journal of Law Reform; J.D. Candidate, University of
Michigan Law School, 2019. I would like to start off by thanking everyone with the Michigan
Journal of International Law who helped me produce this note. For my editing team––
especially Chloe Roddy, Annemarie Smith-Morris, and Lindsay Bernsen Wardlaw––all your
thoughtful feedback was indispensable throughout this process. Also, a special thanks to my
former Notes Editor from the Journal of Law Reform, Nicholas Hazen. Last, but certainly not
least, thank you to my parents for absolutely everything. I would be nothing without you.1.See
Jackson Maogoto, Early Efforts to Establish an International Criminal Court, in THE LEGAL
REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 4–22, 71–74 (José Doria et al. eds., 2009)
(discussing the trajectory of international criminal law regimes leading up to the establishment
of the ICC).
2.
See 3 GIDEON BOAS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 13 (2013);
see, e,g., KAI AMBOS, ROME STATUTE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY XIII (Otto Triffterer & Kai Ambos eds., 3d ed. 2016) (“[T]he [Nuremberg
Tribunal] embodied the modern conviction that individuals should only be punished through a
fair trial which safeguards the rights of the accused.”); Rome Statute of the Int’l Crim. Ct., 17
July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
3.
See BOAS ET AL., supra note 2, at 13; KARIN N. CALVO-GOLLER, THE TRIAL
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ICTY AND ICTR PRECEDENTS 2
(2006) (“The [ICC] is expected to play an exemplary role in the field of criminal justice and
consequently to apply the highest, rather than the minimum internationally recognized[,]
standards of human rights.”).
417
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In the wake of early attempts to provide a forum for international criminal law, the international order arguably attained its greatest achievement:
the ratification of the Rome Statute and the subsequent establishment of the
International Criminal Court (“ICC”). Receptive to many of the critiques
and shortcomings of its predecessors, particularly those relating to how the
ad hoc tribunals provided defense counsel for the accused, the Assembly of
States Parties strove to depart from the design flaws endemic to the ad hoc
4
tribunals. By ratifying the Rome Statute in 2002 and creating a permanent
international criminal court replete with a codified body of criminal law, the
States Parties attempted to end impunity for the perpetrators of the gravest
5
international crimes. One of the strongest developments in that regard was
6
the ICC’s principle of equality of arms.
The equality of arms is “[a]nalogous to fair trial guarantees in domestic
jurisdictions . . . a fair trial requirement that is intended to uphold the adver7
sarial nature of criminal proceedings.” The principle should mean that “no
party to criminal proceedings, be it defense or prosecution, is put in a pro8
cedurally disadvantaged position vis-à-vis the other.” Yet underlying political realities complicate attaining the equality of arms, for the pressures on
the ICC to convict offenders are arguably among the highest any court fac9
es. During her term as President of the ICC, Judge Silvia Fernández de
Gurmendi noted that these pressures have only intensified during the first
10
two decades of the twenty-first century.
11
To ensure the equality of arms, an accused must be given a fair trial. It
is axiomatic that, to have a fair trial, an accused must have competent de12
fense counsel. But while defense counsel competence is a core component

4.
See Maogoto, in THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
supra note 1, at xix; Stuart Ford, The Impact of the Ad Hoc Tribunals on the International
Criminal Court, in THE LEGACY OF AD HOC TRIBUNALS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
313–23 (Milena Sterio & Michael Scarf eds., 2019).
5.
See Maogoto, in THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
supra note 1, at xv (“The state parties committed to put an end to impunity for the most serious crimes of concern to the international community and to contribute to the prevention of
such crimes.”).
.
See Michael A. Newton, Evolving Equality: The Development of the International
6
Defense Bar, 47 STAN. J. INT’L L. 379, 387 (2011) (opining that, without the guarantee of
equality of arms, the international criminal justice system would not be able to secure convictions).
7.
JARINDE P. W. TEMMINCK TUINSTRA, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 153 (2009).
8.
Id.
9.
AMBOS, supra note 2, at XVI.
10.
See id. (discussing the ICC’s increasing jurisdiction and the associated problems
this will pose to the ICC’s legitimacy).
11.
TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 153.
12.
See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (elucidating this principle
in the context of U.S. law).
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of the equality of arms, it has been puzzlingly neglected by ICC legislators
and scholars, just as it was when the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (“ICTR”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
13
(“ICTY”) were active. While much of the framework, statutory law, and
jurisprudence from these ad hoc tribunals carried over to the ICC, it is currently unclear whether, or if, the phenomenon of incompetent defense counsel manifests in the ICC to the same overt degree that it did in the two tribu14
nals.
To date, no ICC proceeding nor any scholarship has addressed this issue. Failing to seriously consider this topic risks condemning the ICC to
path dependence, due to its predecessors’ jurisprudential and structural
shortcomings. Luckily, since the nascent ICC is not bound by ICTY or
ICTR precedent, the issues of defense attorney competence that plagued the
15
ad hoc tribunals do not have to be repeated. Unfortunately, an analysis of
the ICC’s structure and practice reveals that this institution is also derelict in
guaranteeing adequate, competent, and independent defense counsel for the
16
accused. Therefore, in order to safeguard and promote the equality of
arms, significant reform to the ICC’s regulatory framework is needed.
Such reform may be available through the ReVision Project, a recently
proposed program that would “reorganise and rationalise the structure” of
17
the ICC’s Registry. As of now, ReVision aims to diminish the institutional
autonomy held by defense counsel at the ICC. This note proposes, however,
that many of the issues relating to defense counsel at the ICC could be ameliorated by restructuring the Registry to give defense counsel more independence. Consequently, this note proposes using ReVision to instead create a retooled Registry, giving the defense an office within the ICC more
autonomy and an external administrative bar association that is able to seriously address pressing defense matters. This reform represents a significant
departure from the ICC’s predecessors’ jurisprudence, but this note argues
that such a departure is necessary given the distinct nature of the ICC and its
role in the international order.
Part II of this note will examine the phenomenon of incompetent defense counsel at the ICC’s adjudicative predecessors—the ad hoc tribunals
for Rwanda and Yugoslavia—to determine how and why this problem manifested. Part III will then analyze how the ICC strives to depart from the
procedures of the ad hoc tribunals and ensure competent defense counsel by

13.
The ICTR and ICTY will frequently be referred to as simply the ad hoc tribunals
herein.
14.
See Ford, supra note 4, at 313–23.
15.
See CALVO-GOLLER, supra note 3, at 1–2 (stating that the ICC is not bound by
these precedents, but that they can be significantly persuasive authority).
16.
See infra Part III.
17.
Audit Report on the ReVision Project of the International Criminal Court’s Registry, ICC-ASP/15/27, ¶ 6 (Nov. 9, 2016), https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP15/ICCASP-15-27-ENG.pdf.
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assessing the ICC’s current rules, regulations, and relevant case law. Part IV
will conclude with recommended reforms.

II. Ineffective Defense Counsel in the AD HOC Tribunals
The lessons the international community learned from the ad hoc tribunals directly influenced the crafting of the ICC’s structure, procedures, and
18
substantive criminal laws. Consequently, examining the competence of defense counsel at the ICC necessitates a preliminary examination of how the
19
antecedent ad hoc tribunals treated this phenomenon. An analysis of tribunal scholarship, court regulations, and case law reveals that the accused at
the ad hoc tribunals frequently received incompetent representation, a result
likely due to a combination of the structural neglect of defense counsel’s
needs and a reticent, non-interventionist judiciary.
There were deep structural and systemic inequalities between the de20
fense and prosecution at the ICTY and ICTR. Defense teams operated with
21
22
systematic underfunding, less time to investigate charged offenses, far
23
fewer staff compared to the prosecution, limited ability to gather evi24
25
dence, lack of an established defense office, and a significant lack of par26
ity in access to state cooperation during investigations. In short, therefore,
the tribunals’ structural design meant that the defense was dealt a losing
hand at the outset of the proceedings.
Stemming from this lopsided structural and regulatory playing field,
there was a notable disequilibrium between the competency of the prosecu-

.

18
Ford, supra note 4, at 313.
19.
See id. at 315–25 (describing how the drafters of ICC used the experiences of the
ad hoc tribunals to influence how to structure the Rome Statute).
20.
See, e.g., Gabrielle McIntyre, Equality of Arms––Defining Human Rights in the
Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 16 LEIDEN
J. INT’L L. 269, 319–20 (2003) (concluding that the balance of powers at the ICTY was fundamentally skewed in favor of the prosecution).
21.
Newton, supra note 6, at 391.
22.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Callixte Kalimanzira, Case No. ICTR-05-88-A, Appeals
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 36 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Oct. 20, 2010) (finding no violation of
equality of arms despite the contrast between the “large team” of thirty-five investigators who
worked from 1999 to 2008 on behalf of the prosecution and the two investigators available to
the defense for a two and a half month period in 2008).
23.
Id.
24.
Newton, supra note 6, at 392.
25.
Brianne McGonigle, De Facto v. De Jure Equality in the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 13 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 10, 10 (2005). In contrast, the prosecution operated out of a dedicated office. TUINISTRA, supra note 7, at 73 (noting that, at the
ad hoc tribunals, the prosecution enjoyed a formal, independent Office of the Prosecutor).
26.
Newton, supra note 6, at 390 (“The difference in access to international pressure/leverage arguably represents the most significant structural limitation on equality of arms
in the system of international justice.”).
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27

tion and defense counsel. In various instances, the defense counsel’s per28
formance was not on par with any objective standards of competence. For
example, as Professor Sonja B. Starr of the University of Michigan Law
School indicates, tribunals frequently characterized defense motions and
briefs as “incoherent or incomprehensible, or deemed them too unclear to
29
merit consideration.” As the President of the International Center for Transitional Justice, David Tolbert, notes, defense counsel at the ICTY were
“generally unfamiliar with the adversarial system on which the ICTY’s procedure’s [were] modeled and . . . thus had difficulty with cross-examination
30
and other aspects of advocacy.” This led to both subpar representation in
certain cases and “delays in the proceedings, as these lawyers . . . struggled
31
in an unfamiliar system.”
Analyzing why incompetent defense counsel pervaded the ad hoc tribunals informs both why the problem of incompetent defense counsel occurs
at the ICC, as well as why the judicial framework for dealing with this problem is so inadequate. Both topics—the structural flaws that create the problem and the lack of meaningful judicial intervention in response—will be
addressed seriatim.

A. Structural Factors Begetting Defense Counsel Incompetence
There are four causal factors that explain why the accused commonly
received incompetent representation at the ad hoc tribunals: (1) the lack of a
structural defense organ at the tribunals, (2) disadvantageous employment

27.
See, e.g., Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and Functioning of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. A/54/634, ¶ 210 (1999) (characterizing the
performance of a significant amount of defense counsel before the ad hoc tribunals as very
poor); Sonja B. Starr, Ensuring Defense Counsel Competence at International Criminal Tribunals, 14 UCLA J. INT’L L. FOREIGN AFF. 169, 174–88 (2009) (listing several tribunal proceedings that evince ineffective assistance without directly addressing the topic).
28.
Starr, supra note 27, at 171 n.4.
29.
Id. at 171. Professor Starr proceeds to note that “tribunals have frequently observed
that counsel have failed to raise potentially valid objections or arguments at the proper time,
and simultaneously often chastised counsel for raising frivolous motions and arguments.” Id.
(internal citations omitted).
30.
David Tolbert, The ICTY and Defense Counsel: A Troubled Relationship, 37 NEW
ENGLAND L. REV. 975, 979 (2003); see also John E. Ackerman, Assignment of Defense Counsel at the ICTY, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 167, 170 (Richard Mary et
al. eds., 2001) (“To some extent, at least, trials are lengthened by the lack of experience and
training of defence counsel appearing before the Trial Chambers. Many have no experience
whatsoever with criminal law. Many have no experience whatsoever with the adversary nature
of trial proceedings before the ICTY. Many are unfamiliar with the Statute and Rules of Procedure and the practice before the Tribunal that has developed through the case law that has
interpreted and applied the provisions of the Statute and Rules.”).
31.
Tolbert, supra note 30, at 979.
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terms, (3) insufficient reimbursement of counsel, and (4) ineffective hiring
32
qualifications.
The predominant explanation for defense incompetence is that neither
33
the ICTY nor the ICTR had a unified defense organ. The tribunals were
each structured with three formal organs: the Chambers, the Office of the
Prosecutor, and the Registry. All matters pertaining to defense counsel were
subsumed within the “overburdened Registry,” which was simultaneously
34
tasked with administrative responsibilities and judicial support services.
The Registry was not in a position to advocate for defense issues or the
35
rights of the accused. While the Office of the Prosecutor was run by legally trained counsel, the Registry staff members, who had substantial powers
over court-appointable defense counsel, were not required to have any legal
36
training whatsoever, let alone any background as defense counsel. Assigning the unequipped Registry responsibility for all defense-related matters
resulted in four distinct consequences.
The lack of a centralized office, like the Office of the Prosecutor, severely limited the voice of defense counsel and stripped them of the ability
37
to lobby for their interests. Whereas prosecutors could impact the mechanisms of the ad hoc tribunals via the Office’s formal voting privileges on
regulatory matters, defense counsel had no way to impart their perspectives
on these matters, which typically included funding issues, amended court

32.
For a more comprehensive exposition of these factors, see generally Tolbert, supra
note 30, at 979; Newton, supra note 6; and Starr, supra note 27. Another relevant factor is that
defense recruitment at the ad hoc tribunals was “hampered by a comparative lack of prestige
and moral appeal relative to prosecution work, given the nature of the cases.” Starr, supra note
27, at 176.
33.
McGonigle, supra note 25, at 10; see Starr, supra note 27, at 176; see also Isabel
Düsterhöft & Dominic Kennedy, How to Manage the Defence––Experiences from the ADCICTY, in THE DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS: OBSERVATIONS ON THE ROLE
OF THE DEFENCE AT THE ICTY, ICTR AND ICC 227, 228 (Mayeul Hiéramente & Patricia
Schneider eds., 2016) (“[The] apparent lack of [] a crucial ‘fourth organ’ in the majority of
international courts and tribunals undermines the importance of Defence in international justice.”).
34.
McGonigle, supra note 25, at 10.
35.
Till Gut et al., Defence Issues, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
PRINCIPLES AND RULES 1203, 1225–29 (Goran Sluiter et al. eds., 2013) (“[T]he internal defense offices within the Tribunals fall squarely under the responsibility of the Registrar, and
are responsible for implementing legal aid and defence-related logistical support in a neutral
and impartial manner.”).
.
See TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 73–74 (“The Registry administers the assignment
36
of legal aid to the accused and issued the Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel;
establishes whether or not lawyers or other defence team members fulfil the necessary qualification requirements; provides resources to the defence; drafted a Code of Professional Conduct for Defence Counsel; and, monitors defence counsel’s professional behaviour.”).
37.
Id. at 159 (noting that, at the ad hoc tribunals, “[d]efense counsel [had] limited opportunities for mentoring and limited negotiating and lobbying power”).
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rules, ethical and procedural regulations, and hiring criteria. Compounding
39
these disadvantages, defense counsel lacked adequate facilities and re40
ceived substantially less in the way of support staff. Unlike the prosecution, who did not need to pay for office facilities, court-appointed defense
41
counsel were required to pay for their own office spaces near the Hague.
At the same time, because defense counsel were only assigned to work for
the tribunal on a case-by-case basis, many defense attorneys also had to
42
maintain their domestic offices. Consequently, defense attorneys generally
incurred double the expenses of prosecution attorneys, since most of them
had to maintain domestic offices along with their offices near the seat of the
43
tribunals.
Second, defense counsel frequently had to endure disadvantageous em44
ployment terms, which diminished the role’s attractiveness. For example,
45
defense counsel were employed on a contractual basis. In contrast, prosecutors were full-time employees with consistent salaries and dependable job
46
security. Without the same benefits or job security posed by a career track,
there was little incentive for possible defense counsel applicants to enter the
47
role.
Moreover, most of the defense attorneys at the ad hoc tribunals were
“first timers,” as defense counsel seldom represented subsequent clients af-

38.
Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1225–29; see McGonigle, supra note 25, at 10 (“A conflict of interest became apparent in 1997 when the Registry attempted to reduce costs by restricting the maximum number of hours per month Defense Counsel could bill for fees and
greatly limiting the number of investigators and consultants they could hire. Lacking the status of an independent organ, at that time [defense counsel] had no structured defense association to lobby against such changes.”).
39.
TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 166.
40.
Id. at 152–53 (“The OTP [at the ad hoc tribunals] always had more staff members
than the defence. . . . At the ad hoc Tribunals, a maximum of two defense counsel can be assigned to an accused under the legal aid scheme: one lead counsel and one co-counsel. In addition, a maximum of three support staff members . . . may be assigned at the ICTR and a
maximum of five under the lump sum system of the ICTY.”).
41.
See TUINISTRA, supra 16, at 158.
42.
Starr, supra note 27, at 176.
43.
Id.
44.
Id.
45.
Id. (“Because defense teams work on a contract basis, they lack job security provided to prosecution and Chambers attorneys, who are professional-track employees.”).
46.
See id.
47.
TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 160 (“Defense counsel are appointed to any particular
case, only if the accused has chosen them. Having been appointed to one case, an appointment
to a next case does not necessarily follow.”); Starr, supra note 27, at 176 (“[D]efense counsel
tend to be less integrated in the tribunal’s social community; they are physically housed outside the tribunal buildings, and some are actually based in other countries. By undermining
quality of life and professional satisfaction, this isolation risks hurting retention of counsel as
well as initial recruitment.”).
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48

ter their initial case. Unlike for the prosecutors, there was no natural process for defense counsel to learn from one another and pass on their
knowledge; their work was solitary in nature, and, because defense counsel
rarely worked on more than one case at the ad hoc tribunals, there was little
49
opportunity for mentorship. As a result, there was no sense of unity in the
practice, and defense counsel lacked a “collaborative community with insti50
tutional memory.”
Third, there was a stark difference in the remuneration schemes for, and
allocation of resources between, the prosecution and court-appointed de51
fense counsel. Prosecutors could count on a fixed UN salary, and they
were automatically remunerated throughout the duration of their assignment
52
to a case. In contrast, due to both their lack of steady employment and a
different compensation scheme, defense counsel were paid less than the
53
prosecution, and they lacked the same salary protections. Moreover, defense counsel were “only paid 70 to 80 percent of the[ir] monthly allotment
[based on defense counsel’s contract], with the remainder being provided at
54
the end of the stage [of litigation] in question.” Unlike their counterparts,
defense counsel were not entitled to additional funds if the phase of litigation in question lasted longer than the initial estimate in their employment
55
contract, regardless of the cause of delay. Additionally, the Trial Chambers
at the ad hoc tribunals could withhold the remuneration for defense counsel
for filing “frivolous or vexatious motions,” but could not withhold payment
56
to prosecutors.
Fourth, the qualifications required to be hired onto a tribunal’s list of
57
appointable counsel were notoriously maladaptive. To practice as defense
counsel at the ICTY, for example, counsel had to have “at least seven years
of relevant experience, whether as a judge, prosecutor, attorney or in some

48.
TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 161–62 (explaining that most defense attorneys practicing in front of the ad hoc tribunals had no previous experience working with international
criminal law and that these attorneys rarely returned to the ad hoc tribunals after the conclusion of their cases).
49.
Id.
50.
Starr, supra note 27, at 176.
51.
TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 165.
52.
Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1226.
53.
Id.; Mark S. Ellis, Achieving Justice Before the International War Crimes Tribunal:
Challenges for the Defense Counsel, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 519, 530–32 (1997). Note
that this assessment only applies to situations relating to indigent defendants. However, as
Professor Starr notes, “[b]ecause of the enormous cost of defense at the international level,
nearly every defendant qualifies for appointed defense counsel, even though many defendants
are not poor in absolute terms.” Starr, supra note 35, at 171 n.3.
54.
Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1226.
55.
Id.
56.
Id. at 1225.
57.
Starr, supra note 27, at 177–79.
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58

other capacity, in criminal proceedings,” along with established competence in criminal, international criminal, international humanitarian or inter59
national human rights law. As Professor Starr duly remarked, these criteria
did nothing to ensure someone was competent in the laws of the tribunal,
because the quantitative durational prerequisites did not necessarily corre60
late with qualitative competency metrics. That is, “established competence” was not defined, and “seven years of relevant experience” did not ensure that one would have established competence as defense counsel in the
international criminal law context. Such competence was necessary to navigate the legal framework in the ad hoc tribunals, where cases were both fac61
tually and legally complex and procedurally idiosyncratic due to a hybridi62
zation of the civil and common law systems. The ICTR fared no better, as
63
it had, by 2007, virtually identical hiring criteria.

B. Judicial Failure to Redress Issues Caused by
Incompetent Defense Counsel
The judiciary of the ad hoc tribunals failed to ameliorate the systemic
harms of incompetent defense counsel. Unlike judiciaries in various domestic jurisdictions that provide, expound on, and sometimes enforce standards
64
of competent representation, the chambers at the ad hoc tribunals provided
virtually zero judicial oversight for counsel’s competence after appoint65
ment. Whereas domestic courts frequently define adequate levels of competence and enforce them, the judiciary at the ad hoc tribunals rarely ad66
dressed incompetency. From the little case law available on incompetent
67
assistance of counsel, however, we can glean insight into how the tribunals
responded to parties alleging incompetent counsel.
58.
ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.50, Rule 45(B)(iii)
(July 8, 2015); see also TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 40.
59.
ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 58, Rule 45(B)(ii); see ICTY
Directive No. 1/94, IT/73/REV.11, art. 14(A)(iii), https://www.icty.org/x/file/
Legal%20Library/Defence/Assignment_of_counsel_july2006.pdf.
60.
Starr, supra note 27, at 178–79. This duration requirement is likely arbitrary with
little basis in empirical fact. See TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 42–43.
61.
Mark Harmon, Plea Bargaining: The Uninvited Guest at the International Criminal
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia, in THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 163, 174 (José Doria et al. eds., 2009).
62.
Starr, supra note 27, at 178 n.40.
63.
See ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 45(A), (June 15, 2017),
https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-library/070615-rpe-en-fr.pdf; see also Starr,
supra note 27, at 177–78 (“[M]ost ICTR defense counsel have little experience with international criminal cases.”).
64.
Starr, supra note 27, at 186.
65.
Id. at 181.
66.
See id. at 181–83.
67.
Id. at 171 n.4 (listing several tribunal proceedings that evince ineffective assistance
without directly addressing the topic).
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At the ad hoc tribunals, defendants could request relief from incompetent counsel in two ways. First, the accused could request the withdrawal of
counsel. In order to achieve this, the accused had to prove the existence of
“exceptional circumstances” such as the complete breakdown of communi68
cation with the accused’s attorney. However, the tribunals were markedly
69
reluctant to accede to such requests, likely due to concerns that an accused
70
was intentionally attempting to force delay. Even if a claim was meritorious, it would be categorically denied if the accused’s argument was that the
amount of time or resources allocated to the case was insufficient and that
71
this insufficiency precluded effective representation.
Second, an accused could move the tribunal for relief, such as the appointment of new counsel or relief from a tribunal’s holding, if they could
72
prove counsel was incompetent. When confronted with such a motion in
the Tadić case, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY recognized that ineffective representation by counsel was a valid appellate argument if the appel73
lant could establish the existence of “gross professional negligence,” but
noted that there was a strong presumption in favor of counsel’s due dili74
gence absent any clear demonstration of gross incompetence. This became

68.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Decision on Appellant Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza’s Motion Contesting the Decision of the President Refusing
to Review and Reverse the Decision of the Registrar Relating to the Withdrawal of CoCounsel, ¶ 12 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Nov. 23, 2006).
69.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko and Ntahobali, Case No. ICTR-97-21-T,
Decision on Ntahobali’s Motion for Withdrawal of Counsel, ¶¶ 13–25 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
Rwanda June 22, 2001).
70.
Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1219.
71.
See Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., Case No. IT-99-37-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal on Motion for Additional Funds, ¶ 22 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 13, 2003) (“Counsel for the Appellant claim that they may be ethically required to
withdraw from representing the Appellant because they do not have adequate resources to
defend him. The Appeals Chamber observes that the assigned counsel agreed to represent the
Appellant, aware of the system of remuneration for assigned counsel, and are bound thereby.
There has been no change in the terms of representation or in the initial agreement, and counsel are required to fulfil their obligations to the International Tribunal.”).
72.
Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1219; TUINISTRA, supra note 7, at 48.
73.
Prosecutor v. D. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on Appellant’s Motion for
the Extension of the Time-Limit and Admission of Additional Evidence ¶¶ 46–50 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 15, 1998).
74.
Prosecutor v. D. Tadić, supra note 73, at ¶¶ 48-50; Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al.,
Case No. IT-95-16-A, Decision on the Admission of Additional Evidence, ¶ 24 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia April 11, 2001) (“[T]here is a strong presumption that counsel at trial acted with due diligence, or putting it another way, that the performance of counsel
fell within the range of reasonable professional assistance. In assessing whether trial counsel
were ‘grossly negligent,’ the Chamber examining the allegation applies an objective standard
of reasonableness. In determining whether the performance of counsel actually fell below that
standard, an assessment must be made of counsel’s conduct in the circumstances as they stood
at that time.”).
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75

referred to as the “gross incompetence” standard. As the ICTR Appeals
Chamber in Akayesu explained, to prove an accused’s trial counsel was ineffective, the accused needed to further show that counsel’s “gross incompe76
tence” resulted in a miscarriage of justice. This was too onerous a standard
for the accused to meet. As Professor Starr observed, in no explicit instance
did an accused succeed in gaining relief due to an attorney’s poor perfor77
mance. After she gathered the relevant cases, Professor Starr found that the
chambers did not remove counsel or provide relief for the accused even
when counsel submitted subpar pleadings, behaved negligently, or filed
78
frivolous motions.
Further, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadić declared that “[i]f counsel
acted despite the wishes of the Appellant, in the absence of protest at the
time, and barring special circumstances . . . the latter must be taken to have
79
acquiesced, even if he did so reluctantly.” In contrast, in most domestic
jurisdictions, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not predicated on
the defendant raising a motion during their counsel’s ineffective representa80
tion. Such claims are preserved for appeal regardless of whether or not the
81
accused raises an objection sua sponte. But at the tribunals, the accused
needed to meet the extremely onerous standard that “‘his counsel’s incompetence was so manifest as to oblige the Trial Chamber to act’ sua sponte,
and that the Trial Chamber’s failure to do so occasioned a miscarriage of
82
justice.” It is incredibly unrealistic and unfair to foist the burden of making
an objection on the accused, who often have little understanding—if any—
of the law or procedure of the tribunal, independent of their counsel’s ad83
vice.
The record left by the ad hoc tribunals indicates that the problem of in84
competent defense counsel was prolific, yet rarely addressed. One of the
most telling examples comes from the Erdemović case. There, defense
counsel’s poor understanding of the guilty plea concept and of international
75.
See CALVO-GOLLER, supra note 3, at 165 n.724.
76.
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Judgment, ¶ 77 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for Rwanda June 1, 2001).
77.
Starr, supra note 27, at 181–82. However, Professor Starr added that “it is possible
that some could have taken place confidentially.” Id. at 182 n.57.
78.
See id. at 182.
79.
Prosecutor v. D. Tadić, supra note 73, ¶ 65 (emphasis added).
80.
See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 700 (1984).
81.
See, e.g., id.
82.
Starr, supra note 27, at 181 (quoting the ICTR Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v.
Nahimana et al., the so-called Media Case).
83.
Id. (“[The Chamber did not] explain how the non-lawyer defendant is expected to
recognize his counsel’s failings at the trial stage, or to identify the appropriate procedural
stage to raise an objection.”).
84.
Professor Starr lists various examples where counsel was acting in an objectively
incompetent manner. Id. at 171 n.4. Throughout the numerous cases she gathered, Starr discovered instances where counsel’s submissions were incoherent, illegible, or immaterial. Id.
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humanitarian law ultimately caused counsel to advise the accused to plead
guilty to the charge of crimes against humanity, which poses a much higher
sentence and stigma than the charge of war crimes to which he was entitled
85
to plead. Though it allowed Erdemović to vacate his former plea, enter a
plea to the lesser offense, and receive a lesser sentence, the Appeals Chamber was conspicuously silent regarding whether counsel’s conduct was
grossly incompetent, even as it indicated that this issue stemmed directly
86
from counsel’s miscomprehension of plea deals.
In sum, the structure of the ad hoc tribunals permitted, indeed even fostered, the incompetence of defense counsel. In fashioning the unattainable
“gross incompetence” standard and then turning a blind eye to the reality of
incompetent defense counsel, the judiciary failed to counteract these systemic flaws. Consequently, the accused were left with little recourse when
their legal advocates failed to provide adequate representation. This problem
denigrated the accused’s right to a fair trial and the tribunals’ equality of
87
arms, tarnishing the credibility and integrity of the ad hoc tribunals.

III. Defense Counsel Competence at the
International Criminal Court
88

While largely modeled after the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC is and has
been free to avoid many of the pitfalls that prompted incompetent defense
89
counsel in those contexts. Yet, after seventeen years of existence, the
ICC’s track record in this regard is mixed. Although the international community took a proactive role in ameliorating some of the tribunals’ defects
in drafting the Rome Statute, others were retained in the ICC’s framework
90
from the outset. Unfortunately, the positive gains made by the ICC to date
fail to fully offset the design flaws the ICC inherited from the ad hoc tribunals. As a result, the record already reveals the systemic presence of incompetent defense counsel at the ICC.
In assessing the ICC, the first section of this part will cross-analyze the
ICC’s structural framework against the structural flaws of the ad hoc tribunals discussed in Part I. This part will conclude with an examination of how

85.
Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge
McDonald and Judge Vohrah, ¶¶ 15–16 (Oct. 7, 1997).
86.
Id. at ¶ 16 (“[I]t appears to us that defence counsel consistently advanced arguments contradicting the admission of guilt and criminal responsibility implicit in a guilty plea.
If the defence had truly understood the nature of a guilty plea, it would not have persisted in
its arguments which were obviously at odds with such a plea.”).
87.
See Wolfgang Schomburg, The Role of the International Criminal Tribunals in
Promoting Respect for Fair Trial Rights, 8 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 1 (2009).
88.
Ford, supra note 4, at 313–23.
89.
See Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1229.
90.
See infra Part III.
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the ICC Chambers’ polices continue to foster defense counsel incompetence.

A. Comparing the ICC’s Structural Treatment of
Defense Counsel to the Ad Hoc Tribunals’
Of the four predominant issues with the ad hoc tribunals—(1) the lack
of a structural defense organ at the tribunals; (2) disadvantageous employment terms; (3) reimbursement of counsel; and (4) ineffective hiring qualifi91
cations —only one was successfully ameliorated at the ICC: the payment
92
of counsel. Unfortunately, the other three flaws still remain.
From its outset, the ICC was carefully designed to avoid some of the
pitfalls exemplified by the ad hoc tribunals. In the context of incompetent
defense counsel, the Court successfully dealt with the problem of inade93
quate payment of defense counsel using two mechanisms. First, by giving
defense counsel at the ICC what is essentially a salary: They are remunerated on a fixed monthly basis, regardless of any unexpected extension in the
94
case. This is a considerable improvement from the remuneration schemes
95
at the ad hoc tribunals. Second, taking inspiration both from the equality
of arms and the defective compensation system at the ad hoc tribunals, the
payment scheme at the ICC is required to “maintain[] equilibrium between
96
the resources and means of the accused and those of the prosecution.”
Consequently, under the current legal aid policy, the defense and prosecu97
tion receive equal pay. All in all, the ICC has achieved “the most progressive balance between the income of prosecution and defence staff” of all the
98
international criminal courts.
The other three design flaws—the lack of a structural defense organ at
the tribunals; disadvantageous contract-based employment terms; and ineffective hiring qualifications—are still present at the ICC.

91.
See supra Part II.
92.
See TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 165.
93.
Ford, supra note 4, at 313. At the ICTY, for example, if a phase of a proceeding
lasted longer than originally estimated, there was no provision for automatic remuneration.
Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1238–39.
94.
Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1241; Interim Report on Different Legal Aid Mechanisms Before International Criminal Jurisdictions, ICC-ASP/7/12, ¶¶ 21–22 (Aug. 19, 2008),
https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP-7-12_English.pdf.
95.
See supra text accompanying notes 51–56.
96.
ICC Assembly of State Parties, 3rd Sess., Report to the Assembly of States Parties
on Options for Ensuring Adequate Defence Counsel for Accused Persons, ICC-ASP/3/16, ¶
16 (Aug. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Report on Adequate Defense], https://asp.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP-3-16-_defence_counsel_English.pdf.
97.
Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1241–42; William St-Michel et al., Strengthening the
Role of Defense at the International Criminal Court: Reflections on How Defense Is and Can
Be Supported for Greater Effectiveness and Efficiencies, 18 INT’L L. J. 517, 525–26 (2018).
98.
TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 165.
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Just like its predecessors, the ICC was designed without a defense or99
gan. Instead, responsibility to support and promote the rights of the ac100
cused and defense counsel was vested in the head of the Registry. Like the
ad hoc tribunals’ Registries, the ICC’s Registry maintains a list of external
101
defense counsel from which the accused may “freely choose.” Once selected, defense counsel are assigned to clients on an ad hoc, contractual basis without any long-term assurances of job stability; they are, essentially,
102
external consultants.
Moreover, the criteria for inclusion on the Registry’s list are comparable to those of the ad hoc tribunals. To qualify, an applicant must possess
103
“established competence in international or criminal law and procedure.”
According to the Regulations of the Court, “established competence” is
measured purely by the number of years one has worked in either a criminal
104
or international law capacity (which must be more than ten). The disjunctive formulation of this criterion misses the mark, as there is no guarantee
that counsel who meet it will have any familiarity with international criminal law and the ICC’s sui generis makeup. Furthermore, just as under the
tribunals’ criteria, quantitative requirements concerning years of experience
do not necessarily correspond to the qualitative requirement of “established
105
competence. Counterintuitively, the ICC does not mandate any prior criminal defense experience to serve as defense counsel—even for lead defense
counsel. Defense counsel possessing “the necessary relevant experience,
whether as judge, prosecutor, advocate or in other similar capacity, in crim106
inal proceedings” may be appointed. The omission of a requirement for
prior service as defense counsel is striking.
Still, the ICC was not blind to these structural inequities. The drafters of
the Rome Statute tried to mitigate its defense-related shortcomings by bestowing a limited amount of independence for defense counsel: While it
does not have a fully independent defense organ, the ICC does have an of107
fice for defense counsel.

99.
St-Michel et al., supra note 97, at 518–19.
100.
ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1, rule
20(1) (Nov. 2, 2000) [hereinafter ICC RPE].
101.
Id. rule 21(2).
102.
Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1229.
103.
ICC RPE, supra note 100, rule 22(1) (emphasis added).
.
See ICC Regulations of the Court, U.N. Doc. ICC-BD/01-05-16, reg. 67(1) (Nov.
104
15, 2018) [hereinafter ICC RC].
105.
See Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1294; see Starr, supra note 27, at 177 (“[The year
requirement] does not ensure that counsel will have gained relevant experience or skills, and
may actually exclude counsel who do have relevant skills.”).
106.
ICC RPE, supra note 100, rule 22(1).
107.
ICC RC, supra note 104, reg. 77.
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B. The ICC’s Chief Improvement:
The Office of Public Counsel for the Defense
During and directly after the creation of the ICC, there were calls for
the new court to mimic the Sierra Leone Special Court (“SLSC”) by includ108
ing an independent public defense organ. The SLSC is a hybrid international court established by the government of Sierra Leone and the United
Nations to prosecute international criminal law offenses that occurred dur109
ing the Sierra Leone Civil War. Uniquely, the SLSC created an independent “Office of the Principal Defender” with the intention that the office “be110
come as independent as the Office of the Prosecutor.” Tellingly, the ICC
Committee on Budget and Finance conceded that a fourth organ for the defense at the ICC would solve many of the issues facing defense counsel, yet
111
it refrained from seriously considering this proposal. Ultimately, the ICC
summarily dismissed this proposal because of fears of unmanageable con112
113
flicts of interest in related cases and unnecessary cost increases.
Instead, the ICC took a half-step forward by establishing the Office of
114
Public Counsel for the Defense (“OPCD”) within the Registry in 2004. In
contrast to the organization of the ad hoc tribunals, the OPCD provides the
defense with an institutional presence at the ICC. The OPCD’s primary responsibility is to “represent[] and protect[] the rights of the defence during
the initial stages of an investigation” and to “provid[e] support and assis115
tance to Defence Counsel and to persons entitled to legal assistance.”

108.
Report on Adequate Defense, supra note 96, ¶¶ 7–12.
109.
Charles Chernor Jalloh, Special Court for Sierra Leone: Achieving Justice?, 32
MICH. J. INT’L L. 395, 398 (2011).
110.
TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 79.
111.
Report on Adequate Defense, supra note 96, ¶ 9.
112.
Id. (“Given ICC’s specificities as compared to the Sierra Leone Special Court and
any national jurisdiction, a public defender office at the ICC would only be able to assist all
accused and co-accused persons without any risks of conflict of interest if a new public counsel was recruited and assigned for every accused person. Otherwise, since the number of situations before the Court is likely to be limited, and the cases might be closely interrelated, this
would ultimately result in conflicting interests for the public defender representing more than
one accused person.”).
113.
Id. (“[A] public defender office providing full representation of the accused person
would not be cost-effective in the long term, as ultimately support team members, such as legal assistants and investigators, would have to be recruited so as to ensure effective preparation of the defence case. This would necessarily entail a significant increase in staff costs, including not only the salary but also all other allowances to which the staff of the Court is
entitled.”).
114.
Dominic Kennedy & Isabel Düsterhöft, Proper Role for Defense Counsel Organizations, in DEFENSE PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 137, 141 (Colleen
Rohan & Gentian Zyberi eds., 2017).
115.
Masha Fedorova, The Principle of Equality of Arms in International Criminal Proceedings, in DEFENSE PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 204, supra note
114, at 222.
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The OPCD is a laudable attempt at promoting the equality of arms. The
OPCD is allowed to independently perform a number of duties that the ICC
116
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“ICC RPE”) accord to the Registrar.
These duties include (1) direct representation and (2) assistance to defense
117
teams. Regarding the first responsibility, the OPCD counsel may “represent and protect the ‘rights of the defence’ during the initial stages of an investigation,” which may include making “submissions on behalf of a person
118
entitled to legal assistance when defence counsel has not been secured.”
For the second, Regulation 77 of the ICC Regulations of the Court (“ICC
RC”) permits the OPCD to provide “general support and assistance” to de119
fense teams. This may include, for example, “legal research and advice
120
on/assistance with the detailed factual circumstances of the case.” This
support is intended to compensate for the “lack of resources and time”
granted to defense counsel “while ensuring the development of an institu121
tional memory.” By permitting the OPCD to conduct these functions independently, the ICC grants the defense a baseline institutional stature from
which it can manage and internalize issues directly relating to providing effective representation. In this way, and in contrast with the ad hoc tribunals,
122
the OPCD represents a “milestone in improving the work of defence.”

C. Where the OPCD Falls Short: Independence and
Scope of Representation
Unfortunately, however, a deeper examination into how the OPCD operates, both internally and in relation to other institutions within the ICC,
reveals that the defense still lacks meaningful independence at the ICC.
While the OPCD purports to be a “wholly independent office,” it still falls
within the remit of the Registry, which significantly reduces the OPCD’s
123
autonomy. The Registrar, through the Counsel Support Section (“CSS”),
appoints counsel after an accused selects them off the Registry’s list of ap124
pointable counsel, and the Registry controls what sort of substantive du125
ties the office may independently perform. This contrasts poorly with the
Office of the Prosecutor (“OTP”), which is a completely independent office,

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
170.
124.
125.

ICC RC, supra note 104, reg. 77; TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 79.
St-Michel et al., supra note 97, at 532.
Id. at 532–33.
ICC RC, supra note 104, reg. 77(4)(b).
St-Michel et al., supra note 97, at 533.
Id.
Id.
ICC RC, supra note 104, reg. 77(2); see Kennedy & Düsterhöft, supra note 114, at
Kennedy & Düsterhöft, supra note 114, at 142.
Id.
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126

unbound by Registry oversight. Specifically, the OTP, as one of the three
formal organs of the court, is on par with, rather than subsumed within, the
Registry, and it has “an effective voice in revising the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, the regulations of the court, the ongoing budgetary process,
127
and other issues of overall policy and day-to-day operations.” Defense
128
counsel, on the other hand, “do not have an institutional voice.”
Additionally, while the Registrar is tasked with “ensur[ing] the profes129
sional independence of defence counsel,” there are no mechanisms to
guarantee this mandate is seriously implemented. For example, while ICC
regulations require that the Registrar consult with independent representative bodies of counsel regarding matters such as the management of legal
130
assistance and the development of a Code of Professional Conduct, the
Registrar is not required to take any sentiments of these bodies into account
131
after consultation. Defense counsel lack any means to directly manage
such matters. Thus, while the OTP has the autonomy to decide how prose132
cutorial decisions are made, defense counsel remain confined by the dic133
tates of the Registry.
There are other ways that defense counsel are not on par with the prosecution. The ICC relies on States Parties to “ensure that their domestic legal
arrangements enable them to render a number of forms of cooperation, including the arrest and transfer of suspects, the freezing of assets, the protection of victims and witnesses, and the procuring of documentary and testi134
monial evidence.” Unlike the prosecution, which can freely and directly
seek state cooperation requests, the defense is forced to seek state coopera135
tion requests by lobbying the formal organs of the ICC. As this process
usually entails appealing to either the Registrar or the OTP and then the
Chambers, some have criticized this approach as cumbersome, expensive,

126.
See TUINISTRA, supra note 7, at 83.
127.
Kenneth S. Gallant, The Role and Powers of Defense Counsel in the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, 34 INT’L L. 21, 42 (2000).
128.
Id.
129.
ICC RPE, supra note 100, Rule 20(2).
130.
ICC Regulations of the Registry, U.N. Doc. ICC-BD/03-03-13, regs. 119, 120
(Aug. 1, 2018) [hereinafter ICC RR].
131.
See TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 81.
132.
Id. at 73.
133.
Report on Adequate Defense, supra note 96, ¶ 12 (“[The OPCD] will neither be
involved in the administrative and financial management of the legal aid programme, nor be
responsible for the logistic or administrative support to defence and victims’ representatives
teams.”).
134.
Id.
135.
See e.g., Prosecutor v. Katanga et al., ICC Doc. ICC-01/04-01/07-444, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Usacka Attached to the Decision on the “Defence’s Application Pursuant to Article 57(3)(b) of the Statute to Seek Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),” ¶ 6 (Apr. 25, 2008).
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136

and inefficient. Additionally, the OPCD lacks the ability to decide how to
apportion and manage the legal aid dedicated to any particular litigation as
137
well as to broader defense matters. In contrast, the Office of the Prosecu138
tor can determine how its resources are spent.
The interplay between the CSS and the OPCD is particularly bureaucratic, cumbersome, and problematic. While the Court directs the OPCD to
provide legal advice, it mandates the CSS to provide practical and opera139
tional support and assistance. All administrative and logistical matters relating to the defense go through the CSS, which is meant to assist “defence
140
teams in liaising with the other relevant sections within the ICC.” In other
words, while the OPCD is tasked with performing specific defense func141
tions, such as representing the accused during pre-trial proceedings, the
CSS governs how the OPCD carries out those functions. Since proceedings
usually move quickly, the presence of an additional bureaucratic layer that
requires lengthy, formal, and substantiated requests impedes the defense’s
142
efficiency and effectiveness. Moreover, with defense support and assistance split between the OPCD and the CSS, “[t]he overall provision of as143
sistance to counsel is fragmented and responsibilities are unclear.” In
practice, the OPCD performs part of the CSS’s role, resulting in “duplication and lack of clarity between CSS and OPCD [leading] to conflict and . . .
confusion as to which office is responsible for the provision of which ser144
vice.”
Some examples highlight just how problematic and inefficient this interplay can be. For instance, both the CSS and the OPCD arrange office
145
space for defense and victim counsel. Additionally, both the CSS and the
OPCD provide annual educational meetings for both victim and defense
146
counsel. Yet these meetings have not sufficiently addressed issues impact-

136.
INT’L BAR ASS’N’S HUMAN RIGHTS INST., FAIRNESS AT THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 36, 40 (2011).
137.
Report on Adequate Defense, supra note 96, ¶ 6 (“[T]he Registrar is responsible for
the management of legal assistance. This includes the management of public funds used to
pay legal aid.”).
138.
TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 85.
139.
ICC Assembly of State Parties, 13th Sess., Report on the Review of the Organizational Structure of the Registry, ICC-ASP/12/26, ¶ 7(e) (Oct. 28, 2014), https://asp.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP13/ICC-ASP-13-26-ENG.pdf.
140.
St-Michel et al., supra note 97, at 531–32.
141.
ICC RC, supra note 104, reg. 77(4)(a).
142.
See St-Michel et al., supra note 97, at 531–33.
143.
ICC Assembly of State Parties, Report on the Review of the Organizational Structure of the Registry, supra note 155.
144.
Id.
145.
Id.
146.
Id.
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147

ing defense counsel, and the ICC does not provide independent defense148
specific training. Dividing these responsibilities, while simultaneously obligating both offices to provide for defense and victim counsel matters, di149
minishes the defense’s institutional capacity. That is, mandating the
OPCD to undertake non-defense related matters diverts funding and attention that could otherwise be dedicated to defense matters.
Ultimately, the OPCD’s lack of independence is a symptom of broader
restrictions on its ability to fulfill its seminal mandates: representing and
protecting the rights of the defense during the initial stages of an investiga150
tion. For example, in the Lubunga case, a judge requested that the OPCD
temporarily replace a defense counsel, modify a defense application for
151
leave to appeal, and file its redacted version. The OPCD refused, consid152
ering this to be outside the scope of its abilities. The OPCD was not mistaken in this regard: The OPCD is precluded from functioning as defense
counsel for an accused who is already provided with counsel, from replac153
ing counsel, or from becoming part of an accused’s litigation team. Thus,
the OPCD must unfortunately contend with a substantial limitation on its
ability to assist the accused during a crucial state of pretrial litigation.
The issues facing defense counsel are further complicated by their bar
association’s inability to effectively represent them at the ICC.

D. The Lack of Sufficient Collective Representation and
Self-Administration at the ICC
Until the creation of the International Criminal Court Bar Association
(“ICCBA”) in 2016, defense counsel lacked not only a bona fide, independ154
ent structural organ, but formalized collective representation. Per its constitution, the ICCBA is mandated to facilitate defense counsel’s efforts to
obtain support, assistance, and information from the various organs of the
Court, including establishing channels of communication and holding consultations with the Registrar on matters related to counsel and their support

147.
See, e.g., TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 83 (describing one such meeting where “neither time, nor the assistance of an interpreter, had been made available to counsel to discuss
any issues between themselves.”).
148.
Kennedy & Düsterhöft, supra note 114, at 142.
149.
See Rupert Skilbeck, Building the Fourth Pillar: Defence Rights at the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, 1 ESSEX HUM. RTS. R. 66, 85 (2004) (“[I]t has to be acknowledged
that it is absolutely essential for the defence to be considered on an equal basis to the prosecution from the very start, in terms of legal capacity, administrative support, investigations, public relations, media coverage and outreach. Without this, there cannot be a fair trial.”).
150.
See ICC RC, supra note 104, reg. 77(4)(a).
151.
Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-815, Corrigendum to Decision on
the Defense Request for Extension of Time Limits, at 4 (Feb. 12, 2007).
152.
Id.
153.
TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 79.
154.
Kennedy & Düsterhöft, supra note 114, at 142–43.
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155

staff. Moreover, the ICCBA aims to enhance the qualifications of defense
counsel through mandatory training on substantive and procedural interna156
tional criminal law, advocacy, and information technology systems.
Like the OPCD, the ICCBA falls short of its potential. Most notably,
the ICCBA, unlike conventional domestic bar associations, is only a repre157
sentative body, not an administrative one. The ICCBA patently lacks
many other abilities that many domestic bar associations have. The latter
routinely exercise control over who is permitted to practice within a given
jurisdiction, and they have adjudicatory bodies that enforce—by means of
sanctions, monetary fines, and even the stripping of one’s authority to prac158
tice law—their ethical rules. This is because tasks that administrative bar
associations typically perform, such as determining an applicant’s inclusion
on the list of appointable counsel or legal assistants, remain within the remit
159
of the Registry. Furthermore, since ICCBA membership is not mandatory
160
to practice at the ICC, the ICCBA has little influence over the Registrar’s
161
appointment decisions. The ICCBA also lacks a disciplinary adjudicatory
body to enforce its putative mandate of promoting the highest professional
162
standards and ethics. In sum, the absence of such powers means that the
ICCBA is, in effect, a purely lobbying body. While the ICCBA was estab163
lished to give the defense counsel at the ICC a representative bar, it lacks
many of the abilities required to address the issue of incompetent defense
counsel.

E. The Lack of Meaningful Judicial Oversight over
Defense Counsel at the ICC
At the ad hoc tribunals, “structural flaws that reduce[d] the effectiveness of defense counsel may [have] conspire[d] against defendants without
164
regard to factual guilt.” While the ad hoc tribunals’ chambers turned a
165
blind eye to the issue, the ICC Chambers need not, since the ICC is not

155.
Constitution of the International Criminal Court Bar Association art. 2 (June 29,
2018) [hereinafter ICCBA Constitution].
156.
Id. art. 35.
157.
St-Michel et al., supra note 97, at 536.
158.
See generally Quintin Johnstone, Bar Associations: Policies and Performance, 15
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 193, 199 (1996).
159.
Id.
160.
See ICCBA Constitution art. 3(2) (“All persons who are on the ICC List of Counsel
practicing as independent counsel are eligible to be Full Members.”).
161.
St-Michel et al., supra note 97, at 536.
162.
Cf. ICCBA Constitution art. 2(2).
163.
See St-Michel et al., supra note 97, 536.
164.
Note, Fair Trials and the Role of International Criminal Defense, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1982, 2001 (2001) (author unattributed).
165.
See supra Part II.B.
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bound by ad hoc precedent. So, while the ICC has many of the same
structural flaws as the ad hoc tribunals, they could be resolved, at least in
part, by active judicial monitoring of defense counsel competence, and by
provisions shielding the accused against incompetent counsel. Unfortunately, as this section shows, the ICC Chambers apply the same laissez-faire
policy to the actions of incompetent defense counsel that the tribunals’
chambers did.
The lack of meaningful oversight happens at two stages. First, the ICC
has no mechanism to adequately vet whether qualifying counsel may be appointed to a particular case—the accused are free to select any counsel off
of the ICC’s list. Second, as in the ad hoc tribunals, the judiciary fails to
provide meaningful consequences for counsel, and relief to the accused,
when counsel evinces incompetence.

1. Appointment of Defense Counsel
Once a counselor is added to the Registrar’s list of appointable counsel,
“or meets the criteria to be added to the list,” the “ICC Registrar is not em167
powered to refuse to assign or appoint a counsel to a defendant . . . .” This
is true even if counsel ceases to be qualified or was never actually competent to begin with. Instead, the ICC “has adopted a self-regulatory system so
that counsel are responsible for verifying the accuracy of information con168
tained in the application themselves.”
Article 13 of the ICC’s “Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel”
(“CPCC”) provides that “[c]ounsel has a duty to refuse an agreement
where . . . (c) Counsel does not consider that he or she has the requisite ex169
pertise.” Yet this safeguard is inadequate for three reasons. First, by putting the onus on counsel instead of the Registry, the OPCD, the ICCBA, or
any other body of the Court, the ICC leaves the fair trial guarantee of competent representation to the individual counselor’s possibly self-serving
evaluations. Second, and as stressed above, the Registry’s criteria for ap170
pointment are ineffective at best and deleterious at worst. Third, and relatedly, it is doubtful whether any given counselor could proactively establish
whether she possesses the adequate experience and knowledge to work in
this complex legal context, especially since expertise on the workings of the
171
ICC is not a prerequisite.

166.
See CALVO-GOLLER, supra note 3, at 1–2.
167.
Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1222.
168.
Id.
169.
ICC Assembly of State Parties, Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel, U.N.
Doc. ICC-ASP/4/Res.1, art. 13(2)(c) (Dec. 2, 2005) [hereinafter ICC CPCC].
170.
Supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
171.
See Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1292 (noting that an international criminal bar exam could be required for appointed defense counsel).

438

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol.41:417

The Kony case demonstrates how this self-regulatory framework can
172
engender undesirable results. There, a counselor requested translations of
English documents even though, in her application to the Registry, she
173
claimed she was fluent in English. When defense counsel received documents in English relating to the victims’ participation in the proceedings,
she requested “translations into French of all documents [because] her
174
knowledge of the English language [was] insufficient.” In rejecting this
request out of a concern that translation would unduly delay the proceedings, the Pre-Trial Chambers left the accused without recourse from counsel’s misrepresentation—or her actual inability to comprehend material
175
documents. In fact, there was no mention of whether counsel was compe176
tent to handle the litigation.
Kony in fact exemplifies each of the flaws in the self-regulatory system
discussed above: Low appointment standards create a risk that counsel will
not be adequately competent or adequately able to gauge her own compe177
tence. After appointment, the Chambers and the Registry will hardly oversee the performance of counsel to ensure her competence; they are content
with summarily bypassing the issue to promote a “fair and expeditious tri178
al.” This has the potential to be particularly harmful, and indeed unfair, if,
like in Kony, counsel’s mis-estimation of her competence leads to deficits in
179
representation which the Chambers fail to rectify. But relevant ICC stakeholders (the Chambers, Registry, and ICCBA) are unwilling to even discuss
the competency of counsel when presented with a situation where counsel’s
180
incompetence is plausibly impugning the fairness of the proceedings. It
seems likely that because they, like the ad hoc tribunals, do not possess proportional modes of relief for procedural violations, they simply ignore in181
stances of incompetent defense counsel.

172.
Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1222.
173.
Prosecutor v. Kony et al., ICC-02/04-01/05-211, Decision on “Requête de la Défense en Extension de Délai Afin de Répondre aux ‘Observations de la Défense sur les Demandes de Participation à la Procédure a/0010/06, a/0064/06 à a/0070/06, a/0070/06,
a/0081/06 à a/0104/06 et a/0111/06 à a/0127/06,’” 6–7 (Feb. 23, 2007) (English language decision with French title).
174.
Id. at 5.
175.
Id. at 7–8.
176.
See Prosecutor v. Kony et al., ICC-02/04-01/05-211, supra note 173.
177.
TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 49 (“But even if counsel meets the necessary minimum
requirements [to be included on the Registrar’s list of defense counsel], this does not guarantee his competence in conducting an international criminal case.”).
178.
See id. at 7.
179.
Prosecutor v. Kony et al., ICC-02/04-01/05-211, supra note 173.
180.
See Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1222.
181.
See Starr, supra note 27, at 181–83 (discussing “remedial deterrence”).
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2. Judicial Oversight and Remedies for Defendants After
Appointment of Incompetent Counsel
Like the chambers of the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC Chambers fail to
provide any beneficial or effective oversight for defense counsel’s competence after counsel has been appointed to a case. Essentially, the ICC
Chambers grant defense counsel carte blanche to litigate cases notwithstanding clear indications that particular counselors fail to comprehend
mandatory ICC processes. As the Appellate Chamber avowed in Lubanga,
[a]s a rule, counsel is best placed to appreciate the needs of a case,
especially the time needed for going into matters at issue in the way
expected of counsel. The Appeals Chamber has no reason to doubt
duty counsel’s estimation of the time required for the filing of the
182
documents under consideration.
In Lubanga, the Chamber granted the defense’s motion for an extension to
file “the relevant documents” because counsel arrived to the Hague and interviewed her client for the first time just one day before the original due
date to file the “Defence submissions on the scope of the right to appeal
183
within the meaning of article 82(1)(b) of the Statute.”
The Chambers’ expectation that counsel act with due diligence
throughout the representation is paired with considerable deference to the
184
defense, a level of deference reminiscent of the ad hoc tribunals. If defense counsel abuse their widely-allotted discretion, the Chambers may impose consequences against them, but unfortunately these consequences routinely fail to provide sufficient recourse for the accused.
Counsel’s failure to act with due diligence may result in the Chambers
refusing to consider motions filed by counsel, even if they are necessary to
185
secure vital rights for the accused. For example, in Katanga and
Ngudjolo, defense counsel attempted to challenge the lawfulness of the arrest and detention of the accused, which must be done in a motion filed in
186
the Pre-Trial Chamber. However, despite “the various opportunities afforded,” counsel inexplicably filed the motion in the Trial Chamber, which
187
is not equipped to adjudicate such claims. As a result, the Trial Chamber

182.
Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-903, Decision of the Appeals
Chamber on the Defense Application for an Extension of Time of 9 May 2007, ¶ 3 (May 4,
2007).
183.
Id.
184.
See supra Part II.B.
185.
Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1222.
186.
See Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-2259, Judgment
on the Appeal of Mr. Katanga Against the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 20 November 2009
Entitled “Decision on the Motion of the Defence for Germain Katanga for a Declaration on
Unlawful Detention and Stay of Proceedings,” ¶¶ 16–18 (July 12, 2010).
187.
See id. ¶¶ 18–19.
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flatly denied the defense’s motion on unlawful detention and stay of pro188
ceedings.
And while improper filings also occur in domestic courts, where they
also sometimes harm defendants, negligent mistakes in domestic courts can
provide the basis for valid ineffective assistance of counsel claims on ap189
peal. Unfortunately for the accused at the ICC, such negligence is unlikely
190
to be found sufficient to support a gross incompetence claim.
In Situation in Darfur, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber appointed ad hoc
191
counsel from the Registrar’s list to enable the defense to respond to amicus briefs relating to the protection of victims and the preservation of evi192
dence. The Chamber did this pursuant to ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence Rule 103, which permits the Chamber to appoint counsel for the
193
limited purpose of respond to amicus briefs. Violating the limited authorization of RPE 103, the counselor in Darfur took it upon himself to address
virtually everything relevant for the case, save for the actual amicus
194
briefs: While he indicated an awareness of Rule 103’s scope, the counselor’s legal submissions mainly related to jurisdiction and the admissibility of
195
196
197
evidence. Apparently, defense counsel relied on articles 5 and 6 of the
Code of Conduct as a justification for bypassing ICC RPE 103, despite hav198
ing been explicitly instructed about the clear limits of his mandate.
Thankfully, the Chamber swiftly chastised counsel’s behavior as being
“misconceived [in its] flagrant disregard of the provisions of the Statute, the

188.
Id. ¶ 19.
189.
See, e.g., Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 383–85 (1986) (holding that failure to timely file an evidentiary suppression motion may support a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland standard).
190.
Of course, this has never been tested before at the ICC. However, such claims have
overwhelmingly failed before the ad hoc tribunals. See Starr, supra note 27, at 171–83.
191.
Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-12, Decision of the Registrar Appointing Mr. Hadi
Shalluf as Ad Hoc Counsel for the Defence, at 3 (Aug. 25, 2006).
192.
Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-10, Decision Inviting Observations in Application
of Rule 103(2) ICC REP, 4–6 (July 24, 2006).
193.
ICC RPE, supra note 100, Rule 103; see Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-66, Decision on the Request for Review of the Registry’s Decision of 13 February 2007, 7 (Mar. 15,
2007).
194.
See Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-66, Decision on the Request for Review of the
Registry’s Decision of 13 February 2007, 7 (Mar. 15, 2007).
195.
TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 228–29.
196.
ICC CPCC, supra note 169, art. 5 (setting forth a mandatory oath to be taken by
appointed defense counsel that they represent the accused “with integrity and diligence, honourably, freely, independently . . . .”) (emphasis added).
197.
Id art. 6 (stating that “[c]ounsel shall act honorably, independently and freely.
Counsel shall not permit his or her independence, integrity or freedom to be compromised by
external pressure . . . .”).
198.
Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-66, Decision on the Request for Review of the Registry’s Decision of 13 February 2007, 3 (Mar. 15, 2007).
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Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Regulations of the Court.” As
one would expect, it did not take the Pre-Trial Chamber in Darfur much ef200
fort to find that counsel’s submissions were “frivolous and vexatious,”
201
and, as such, beyond the scope of counsel’s mandate. On this basis, the
Chamber discharged counsel of his duties and, as a sanction, withheld reim202
bursement for counsel’s work. In isolation, this may have been an adequate remedy. But it failed to account for the burden of further litigation and
the ultimate risk of serious fair trial violations which this slip-up foisted upon the accused. Representation in Darfur was delayed for months, and no
associated remedy was provided to the accused, irrespective of the speedy
203
trial implications caused by counsel’s error.
The lopsided structural organization of the Court, along with a lack of
administrative or judicial oversight, permits the phenomenon of incompetent counsel to exist without much recourse. Chambers’ unwillingness to
earnestly and explicitly adjudge counsel’s conduct as incompetent—and
provide corresponding remedies to harmed defendants—is especially alarming. No discussion, as of this writing, has taken place about what standards
the ICC will employ when confronting egregiously inept defense counsel. If
reform is not seriously considered, the structural inequalities between the
defense and prosecution will continue to jeopardize the accused’s right to
competent representation and a fair trial, compromising the equality of arms
and impugning the ICC’s legitimacy.

IV. Strengthening the Defense at the ICC:
Proposals for Reform
The ICC is stuck in a state of uneasy uncertainty. On the one hand, the
ICC’s treatment of defense counsel is an improvement over the ad hoc tribunals’, principally because of the remuneration parity between the prosecution and the defense and the partial institutionalization of the defense within
the OPCD and the CSS. On the other hand, defense counsel still lack meaningful institutional autonomy and are subject to overtly bureaucratic frag199.
Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-52, Decision on the Ad Hoc Counsel for the Defence’s Request for Leave to Appeal the Decision of 2 February 2007, 7 (Feb. 21, 2007).
200.
Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-10, Decision Inviting Observations in Application
of Rule 103(2) ICC REP, 6–7 (July 24, 2006) (finding that ad hoc counsel had “completely
disregarded the precise and clear scope of his mandate by adopting his own interpretation of
the mandate.”).
201.
Id. at 7 (“[G]iven the fact that the ad hoc Counsel has been acting beyond the scope
of his mandate, the Chamber is of the view that he is in no position to demand payment of
fees for the vexatious and frivolous claims instituted before this Chamber for the said period.”).
202.
Id.
203.
See TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 240; see also INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, supra note 35, at 217–22 (describing speedy trial rights of the accused at the
ICC and mechanisms the ICC has employed to increase the speed of trial).
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mentation and minimization. Despite repeated calls to establish a discrete
fourth organ for the defense, the ICC seems loath to seriously consider this
204
option. Even as it rejects this idea, the ICC fails to analyze the effects of
incompetent defense counsel in practice, depreciating the accused’s right to
a fair trial and tarnishing both the efficacy of the Court’s fact-finding func205
tion and its socio-cultural legitimacy.
Ameliorating the relatively ignored, yet pernicious, phenomenon of incompetent defense counsel necessitates a restructuring of the OPCD. Any
reform must endow the OPCD with more authority in regulating defense
matters while simultaneously reducing bureaucratic redundancies, namely
eliminating the bifurcation of defense responsibilities between the OPCD
and the CSS. The most straightforward option is to establish the OPCD as a
206
formal defense organ at the ICC. Yet the States Parties have consistently
denied this proposal, and nothing indicates this will change in the immediate
207
future.
Reconfiguring the ReVision Project presents a more immediate and effective solution. While the project in its original form aims to strip the
OPCD of independence, its regulatory framework can be amended to endow
the OPCD with more autonomy, even as it remains under the Registry. The
remainder of this note will turn to how this can be achieved.

A. The Infeasibility of Establishing an Independent Defense Organ
As many have indicated, establishing a fourth defense organ at the ICC
would largely remedy and “counterbalance” the ICC’s structural bias to208
wards the prosecution. Per Professor Kenneth Gallant of the University of
Arkansas Law School, “the [ICC’s] structure could be greatly strengthened
by the creation of a Bureau of Defense Counsel, analogous to the Office of
209
the Prosecutor.” It would permit defense counsel to enjoy career-based
210
instead of contractual employment. Such an organ would also permit the
defense to “maintain the list of approved attorneys, train them in the specialized procedures, redress institutional bias and generally ‘go far toward guaranteeing that the right to counsel truly means the right to adequate and ef-

204.
See, e.g., Report on Adequate Defense, supra note 96, ¶ 6.2 (“The costs of establishing an independent body could be substantial. Not only would there be no gains in terms
of efficiency but there would only be a shift in terms of workload and no savings in terms of
staff costs.”).
205.
See id.; Schomburg, supra note 87, at 1.
206.
See, e.g., Fair Trials and the Role of International Criminal Defense, supra note
164, at 2004–05 (2001).
207.
See e.g., Report on Adequate Defense, supra note 96, ¶ 6.2.
208.
Fair Trials and the Role of International Criminal Defense, supra note 164, at
2005.
209.
Gallant, supra note 127, at 42.
210.
See Starr, supra note 27 at 190.
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211

fective counsel.’” To be entirely clear, if the States Parties are willing to
create this formal fourth organ at the ICC for the defense, they should.
Unfortunately, it is increasingly unlikely that such a reformulation of
the ICC’s structure will happen in the immediate future. This type of re212
structuring would require an amendment to the Rome Statute, initiated by
213
a State Party. Adopting this amendment would then require a two-thirds
214
majority of States Parties. Such a formal amendment is unlikely to succeed, let alone be proposed in the first place, because there is general “discontent with [the OPCD’s] work and doubts whether funds granted to the
215
Office are well-invested . . . .” Put simply, the Registrar’s current focus is
216
not with giving the defense more autonomy, but less. An independent Bureau of Defense becomes even more improbable after observing the hostility
217
this proposal encountered in the past. Therefore, it is unlikely the issues
outlined in this note could be resolved by establishing an independent defense organ at the ICC.

B. Augmenting the OPCD’s Independence Under a
Reformulated ReVision Project
Simply because establishing a formal fourth organ at the ICC for defense is unlikely does not condemn the defense to institutional inferiority
and systemic inefficacy. The OPCD can be improved without necessarily
increasing the OPCD’s funding. By refining the framework of the ReVision
Project, many of the structural flaws plaguing the defense may be resolved.
An amendment to the Regulations of the Court or the Regulations of the
Registrar—either by judicial members of the Presidency or the Registrar itself—could streamline the rules governing the OPCD, while instilling the
defense with more institutional autonomy. Such an amendment, essentially
keeping the OPCD as an administrative office, would not require formal

211.
Fair Trials and the Role of International Criminal Defense, supra note 164, at 2005
(quoting Gallant, supra note 127, at 42).
212.
Philipp Müller, Promoting Justice Between Independence and Institutional Constraints: The Role of the Office of the Public Counsel of the Defence at the ICC, in THE
DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS: OBSERVATIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE
DEFENCE AT THE ICTY, ICTR AND ICC 245, 268 (Mayeul Hiéramente & Patricia Schneider
eds., 2016).
213.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 122.
214.
Id.
215.
Müller, supra note 212, at 268 (explaining that the OPCD has never been able to
entirely fulfill its mandate due to lack of adequate funding, which has, in turn, spurred more
doubt about the necessity of a stronger institutional capacity for the defense at the ICC).
216.
See ICCBA, International Bar Association Comments on Draft Registry Revision
Project Paper: ‘Basic Outline of Proposals to Establish Defence and Victims Offices’ 2–6
(Jan. 12, 2015) [hereinafter ICCBA, International Bar Association Comments],
http://9bri.com/iba-comments-on-draft-registry-revision-project-paper.
217.
See, e.g., Report on Adequate Defense, supra note 96, ¶ 6.2
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218

States Parties’ ratification. A similar process could revitalize the ICCBA,
essentially transforming this bar association into an administrative body
analogous to many domestic bar associations.

1. Exploring the Initial ReVision Project
Herman von Hebel, the current Registrar, had a similar goal in mind
219
when he initiated the ReVision Project in 2014. This project is intended to
“provide[] a structural framework that will optimize the Registry’s performance in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability[;] not to generate immediate significant cost savings but rather, to achieve much more
220
efficient results with existing resources . . . .” The project takes particular
aim at the defense. Per von Hebel, “some of [the defense’s] functions are
not performed adequately, there is fragmentation, unnecessary bureaucracy,
inefficiency, and a lack of clarity in relation to the performance of Defence221
related functions.” Specifically, because the OPCD and the CSS do not
have clearly delineated obligations, von Hebel noticed that these two offices
performed many of the same tasks, which resulted in a “lack of cooperation,
222
duplication and conflicts.” As this note has demonstrated, von Hebel was
correct to lob these critiques at the defense.
However, von Hebel’s ReVision Project sought to remedy these issues
with a superficially enticing, yet ultimately flawed approach: by synthesiz223
ing the OPCD with the CSS into a “single Defence Office.” The Defense
Office was envisioned as assuming the CSS’s logistical duties—which include dealing with requests for IT equipment, offices, travel, and interpreta224
tion —but not the OPCD’s existing substantive duties, such as representing the accused during pre-trial proceedings or attending to defense interests

.

218
See ICC RC, supra note 104, reg. 6; see also Hirad Abtahi & Shehzad Charania,
Expediting the ICC Criminal Process: Striking the Right Balance Between the ICC and States
Parties, 18 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 383, 410–17 (2018) (observing that the ICC’s Regulations of
Court may be amended through the Presidency or the Registrar without requiring formal
Rules’ amendments).
219.
Müller, supra note 212, at 142.
220.
Int’l Criminal Court Assembly of State Parties, Proposed Programme Budget for
2016 of the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/14/10, ¶ 294 (Sep. 2, 2015).
221.
International Criminal Court Registry, Registrar ReVision Project: Basic Outline of
Recent Proposals regarding the Defence, at 1 (Sep. 15, 2014), http://michaelgkarnavas.net/
files/140954-outline-defence-proposals.pdf.
222.
Id. at 2.
223.
Registrar ReVision Project: Basic Outline of Recent Proposals Regarding the Defense, supra note 221, at 2; see Müller, supra note 212, at 263 (“Only an office [OPCD] independent from the Registry will be entrusted by counsel with requests for assistance potentially
revealing confidential information, impending motions, or aspects of case strategy, or be
granted direct access to potentially confidential material.”).
224.
St-Michel et al., supra note 97, at 531–32.
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during the investigatory stage. Moreover, departing from the current organizational structure—wherein the OPCD reports directly to the Registrar—the ReVision Project’s new “Defence Office” would be further relegated as a sub-office of the Registry’s newfound “Division of Judicial
226
Services.” Effectively, the new Defense Office would, counterintuitively,
strip the defense of the little institutional autonomy it currently possesses.
In fact, under ReVision, the ICC would cease any representation of the
227
accused. Instead, much like at the ad hoc tribunals, representation of defendants would reside solely with duty counsel appointed on an ad hoc ba228
sis. The ReVision Project envisioned that a formal “independent selfgoverning Association of Defence Counsel” would manage the representa229
tion of all clients receiving court-appointed counsel. This body would
230
serve as the defense’s administrative liaison with the ICC.

2. The Failure of the ReVision Project’s Approach to the Defense
The portion of the ReVision Project designed to strip the ICC of its capacity to provide court-appointed support to defendants was not wellreceived outside the ICC. Defense counsel, bar associations, and judges
were principally concerned that recalibrating the structure of the defense
would diminish the defense’s institutional independence by taking away the
defense’s ability to represent the accused and assist defense teams during
231
the pre-trial stage.
Yet von Hebel considered this consolidation to be one of the strengths
232
of ReVision. Specifically, he thought reducing the bureaucratic inefficiencies between the CSS and the OPCD would “strengthen the support and assistance to the defence, which will benefit the conduct of the proceed-

225.
Report on the Review of the Organizational Structure of the Registry, supra note
143, at 8; St-Michel et al., supra note 97, at 533 (noting the OPCD’s current functions); Registrar ReVision Project: Basic Outline of Recent Proposals Regarding the Defense, supra note
221, at 3–4; Müller, supra note 212, at 261.
226.
Registry of the Int’l Criminal Court, Comprehensive Report on the Reorganisation
of the Registry of the ICC, 1–2 (Aug. 2016). [hereinafter Reorganization of the Registry of the
ICC]; Report on the Review of the Organizational Structure of the Registry, supra note 143, at
8.
227.
ICCBA, International Bar Association Comments, supra note 216, at 4.
228.
Müller, supra note 212, at 261.
229.
Registrar ReVision Project: Basic Outline of Recent Proposals Regarding the Defense, supra note 221, at 3.
230.
Id.
231.
See, e.g., ICCBA, International Bar Association Comments, supra note 216, at 2–6.
See generally Müller, supra note 212, at 261–66.
232.
Report on the Review of the Organizational Structure of the Registry, supra note
143, at 4.
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233

ings.” From von Hebel’s perspective, this benefit is so worthwhile that it
234
justifies stripping the ICC of some of its existing defense capacities.
Unfortunately, disbanding the OPCD as an independent office would
235
have two major negative effects. First, since the Defence Office will not
represent clients, the accused would not have access to “swift and focused
236
assistance and representation” when in “immediate need of legal advice.”
Instead, the accused would receive ad hoc representation by external counsel, who may not have the same expertise and whose appointment may result in delayed pretrial assistance relative to assistance from OPCD’s counsel. Worryingly, since all defense counsel would be appointed on an ad hoc
basis, the defense would lose any institutional memory gained by virtue of
having employed attorneys habitually working on similar cases with similar
237
legal issues. As a result, the same issue that plagued the ad hoc tribunals
may manifest again in full: the perpetual recycling of “first timers” to take
on extremely complicated cases governed by a sui generis procedural
238
framework.
Second, the defense would lose its internal, institutional voice to advo239
cate for defense matters within the ICC. Defense counsel, as employees of
the Defence Office, would instead need to fully conform to the dictates of a
subdivision of the Registry, a step further removed from being able to adequately influence defense matters than they were when reporting to the Reg240
istry itself. The proposed Association of Defence Counsel (or, as discussed below the ICCBA), as an external representative body, could
ameliorate these concerns to some degree, but it is no replacement for defense counsel’s missing internal leverage.
Fortunately, the portion of ReVision merging the OPCD and the CSS
into a single Defence Office is on indefinite hold due in large part to inter241
national backlash. While both the CSS and the OPDC now report to the
Division of Judicial Services, which reports to the Registry, the two bodies
242
continue to function separately. The rest of ReVision has proceeded as

233.
Id.
234.
ICCBA, International Bar Association Comments, supra note 216, at 3.
235.
See, e.g., Müller, supra note 212, at 261–66.
236.
Id. at 262.
237.
See Starr, supra note 27, at 176.
238.
Supra text accompanying note 33.
239.
ICCBA, International Bar Association Comments, supra note 216, at 6–7.
240.
Müller, supra note 212 at 263.
241.
Reorganization of the Registry of the ICC, supra note 226, at 12 (in describing the
newly formed Division of Judicial Services, the Registry report states that the proposal to
amend the Regulations of Court to synthesize the OPCD and the CSS into the Defense Office
has been put on “hold”).
242.
Id. at 5.
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planned. The Registrar implemented the massive overhauls of ReVision—
such as merging all field operations into the Division of External Opera244
tions—while maintaining the presence of the OPCD. While this state of
transitional irresolution is inefficient, since the Registry is not operating under one unified plan, it presents the ICC with an opportunity to correct the
mistakes of ReVision and to tailor the project in a manner that properly responds to the issues afflicting defense counsel and the representation of the
accused. A middle ground that would resolve the most divisive aspects of
ReVision is achievable.

C. Re-establishing the OPCD as a Division Under the Registrar
Instead of replacing OPCD with a Defence Office within the Division
of Judicial Services as ReVision originally planned, this note proposes that
the OPCD should become the fourth major division serving directly under
the Registrar, retaining its current responsibilities and assuming some of the
responsibilities of the CSS. Thus, while the OPCD would still be under the
Registry, it would have considerably more formal institutional authority and
independence.
In affecting this change, regulation 77 of the ICC RC should be amended to grant the OPCD full independence, not just independence in conduct245
ing the office’s substantive work. The Registrar or the ICC President may
amend the RC in this fashion without requiring formal Rules’ amend246
ments. In its current form, regulation 77 states that “[t]he Office of Public
Counsel for the defence shall fall within the remit of the Registry solely for
administrative purposes, in accordance with article 43, paragraph 2, and it
247
shall function in its substantive work as a wholly independent office.” The
proposed reform would delete the phrase “in its substantive work” within
the last clause. Consequently, the OPCD would have a codified mandate to
“function as a wholly independent office.”
This restructuring would create a unified body for defense counsel that
would streamline the inefficiencies that plague the current OPCD-CSS
framework. The OPCD would control how it appoints counsel to cases during the investigatory stages of litigation, who it appoints to particular cases,
how it apportions and manages legal aid, how it manages the list of appointable counsel, and how it tailors specific defense counsel training—to
name just a few responsibilities. It would also assume the logistical defense-

243.
See Int’l Criminal Court, Audit Report on the ReVision Project of the International
Criminal Court’s Registry, ICC-ASP/15/27, ¶¶ 1–5 (Nov. 9, 2016).
244.
Reorganization of the Registry of the ICC, supra note 226, at 48–49.
245.
Note that, under the prior framework for the OPCD, the office enjoyed limited autonomy because it was able to have independence in how it conducted certain responsibilities
relating to substantive litigation.
246.
See Abtahi & Charania, supra note 223, at 410–17.
247.
ICC RC, supra note 104, reg. 77.
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team support duties that the CSS currently holds, including managing defense counsel’s requests for IT equipment, training, offices, travel, and in248
terpretation. The consolidated office would therefore resolve the bureaucratic redundancies that initially provoked ReVision, leaving a more
efficient and unified defense division—without neutering the ICC’s ability
to provide counsel when needed.
Notably, the newly empowered OPCD would not be responsible for
victim participation and representation. Those duties would be transferred to
the Division of Judicial Services, the Detention Section, the Language Services Section, the Information Management Services Section, and the Court
249
Management Section, respectively. These sections oversee logistical and
250
administrative functions vis-à-vis court proceedings. Keeping victim services largely under the Division of Judicial Services would fit its mission,
and the CSS could accordingly be eliminated since all of its prior responsibilities relating to victim matters would be transfer to other sections (and all
of its defense responsibilities would be transferred to the OPCD). Consequently, though decreasing spending for defense matters was not a goal of
251
ReVision, it is noteworthy that this proposal is budget-neutral: OPCD’s
defense representation remains funded due to the ongoing hold on the de252
fense-specific portion of ReVision, and the money currently allocated to
CSS would be re-allocated right alongside its responsibilities.

D. Empowering the ICCBA to Function as an Administrative Bar
When von Hebel proposed the creation of the Association of Defence
Counsel to act as an external bar association in 2014, the ICC lacked any
253
similarly structured defense bar. Since 2016 defense counsel at the ICC
have had access to an external, independent representational body in the
254
form of the ICCBA. While there are problems with the current structure
of the ICCBA, these issues would be resolved if the ICCBA became more
like a domestic bar association—imposing a mandatory bar exam and regu-

248.
St-Michel et al., supra note 97, at 532.
249.
See Reorganization of the Registry of the ICC, supra note 226, at 49.
250.
Id. at 110–11.
251.
Report on the Review of the Organizational Structure of the Registry, supra note
143, at 1–2.
252.
Id. at 24.
253.
As stated above, the ReVision Project was instituted in 2014. Proposed Programme
Budget for 2016 of the International Criminal Court, supra note 220, at 79. The establishment
of the ICCBA came in July 2016 and its recognition by the Assembly of States Parties came
in November 2016. INT’L CRIM. CT. BAR ASS’N, About Us, https://www.iccbaabcpi.org/aboutus (last visited Jan. 26, 2019).
254.
The lack of an external, independent representational body was a major reason animating von Hegel’s ReVision project. See Registrar ReVision Project: Basic Outline of Recent Proposals Regarding the Defense, supra note 221, at 3–4. Thus, the ICCBA would satisfy
one of von Hegel’s desires to create an external body for the representation of defense matters.
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lating membership—and if the ICCBA had a codified relationship with the
255
newly elevated OPCD.
To the first point, the ICC should mandate that, in order to be appointable, defense counsel become members of the ICCBA. The ICCBA could
then vet appointable counsel by imposing a required bar examination and
application process to ensure adequate employment qualifications for list
256
counsel. To effectuate this, regulations 75 and 76 of the ICC Regulations
of Court should both be amended to provide that counsel can only be ap257
pointed to represent an accused if they are active members of the ICCBA.
Importantly, the criteria currently imposed by the Registrar in ICC RPE
258
22 would not be amended themselves, only supplemented. Thus, the actual requirements for appointable counsel would still revolve around the criteria stipulated by the Registrar—that counsel have “established competence
259
in international or criminal law.” To amend these criteria directly would,
260
unfortunately, require ratifications by the States Parties. However, demanding that defense counsel pass a bar exam focusing on international
criminal law and procedure would accomplish a similar end, rendering the
ICCBA and the OPCD better poised to address the issue of incompetent defense counsel.
An ICCBA bar exam would provide a more effective baseline for determining competency with international criminal law than the Registrar’s
current criteria alone, as it would mandate familiarity with the basic procedural concepts underlying the ICC’s adjudicatory process, such as plea bar261
gaining. Such an exam could, of course, test only basic competence to refrain from discriminating against counsel hailing from jurisdictions
completely dissimilar to the ICC, such as those that do not engage in adversarial cross-examination. That said, the procedural and statutory law that

255.
It should be noted that creating the Association of Defense Counsel and dissolving
the ICCBA would serve the same effect if the former comported with the recommendations
proposed in this section.
256.
See TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 46 (arguing that a bar exam “should be introduced”
at the ICC to “guarantee[] that [counsel] is abreast of the legal issues involved in international
criminal cases upon his assignment to any particular case”).
257.
See ICC RC, supra note 104, regs. 75, 76.
258.
Int’l Crim. Ct., ICC-PIDS-LT-02-002/13_Eng, Rules of Procedure and Evidence
Rule 22 (2013).
.
Int’l Crim. Ct., ICC-PIDS-LT-02-002/13_Eng, Rules of Procedure and Evidence
259
Rule 22(1) (2013); Müller, supra note 212, at 245–68.
260.
Müller, supra note 212, at 142–62. As discussed supra at 34–36, such an endeavor
seems infeasible at present.
261.
Without such a procedure, it is foreseeable that counsel may not possess the adequate familiarity with procedural concepts frequently used in international criminal law.
Speaking directly to plea bargaining, in Erdemović, the defendant was permitted to withdraw
his guilty plea because neither his attorney lacked any comprehension about the concept of
pleading guilty. Prosecutor v. Erdemoviü, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and
Judge Vohrah, supra note 85, ¶¶ 16–18.
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makes the ICC a sui generis court would certainly be fair game, and the exam could predominantly focus on the Rome Statute itself, along with the
ICC RPE.
To assuage the inherent disadvantage some counsel may face during the
exam due to their domestic legal customs, the OPCD could supplement the
exam with alternative screening procedures, following in the footsteps of
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (“STL”). In exceptional situations, this
supplemental procedure could even completely supplant the bar exam. The
STL’s internal Admission Panel, which resides within a specific defense or262
gan conducts interviews to determine whether a defense counsel applicant
possesses the requisite “experience and competence in criminal law or in263
ternational criminal law.” Additionally, as a condition for appointment to
any case, the STL mandates that defense counsel undertake compulsory
264
training in certain legal areas, such as international criminal procedure.
These training requirements could be implemented if regulation 76 of the
ICC RC, which provides the criteria governing the appointment of coun265
sel, were amended to bestow upon the OPCD the ability to impose addi266
tional prerequisites for the appointment of counsel in particular cases.
While becoming a member of the ICCBA would be more demanding
than before, such a shift is necessary to impose meaningful criteria for at267
torney competence before attorneys are appointed to a case. As we have
seen, the Chambers are loath to provide meaningful supervision of counsel
268
competence. Solving this issue at the outset requires more effective stand269
ards for vetting who can become appointed as defense counsel. Moreover,
the obligation to take a bar examination to practice in domestic jurisdictions
270
is an accepted reality. Practicing in front of the ICC ought to be treated no
less stringently than moving between domestic jurisdictions, and thus imposing a bar exam for attorneys at the ICC is neither a surprising nor an
262.
The STL is the only international adjudicative body in which the defense currently
has an official organ. Kennedy & Düsterhöft, supra note 114, at 139.
263.
Special Trib. for Leb., STL/BD/2009/03/REV.5, Directive on the Assignment of
Defense Counsel, rule 9(D) (2016).
264.
Special Trib. for Leb., STL-BD-2009-01-REV.8, Rules of Procedures & Evidence,
rule 58(C) (2016).
265.
ICC RC, supra note 104, reg. 76.
.
266
While the ICC RC could be amended without States Parties ratification, the core
criteria for the appointment of list counsel would also require an amendment to the ICC RPE,
which would require ratification. See Müller, supra note 212, at 245.
267.
See Starr, supra note 27, at 177–78, 195–205.
268.
See supra Part III.E.
269.
See Starr, supra note 27, at 177–78, 195–205.
270.
See e.g. Andrew M. Perlman, A Bar Against Competition: The Unconstitutionality
of Admission Rules for Out-of-State Lawyers, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 135, 143–44 (2004)
(discussing the bar exam requirements forced upon practicing lawyers wishing to practice law
in other states in the United States, i.e., states for which the lawyers do not possess a bar certification).
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overly exacting requirement. As Professor Starr notes, “[g]enerally, domestic bars do not automatically admit foreign lawyers on the basis of admission to practice and experience in their home countries. Instead, most domestic bars demand some showing of competency within the legal system in
271
which the lawyer is seeking to practice.” Similarly demanding a showing
of some competency with the ICC’s complicated legal framework fits comfortably within this tradition.
After an individual gains ICCBA membership, the ICCBA should perform ongoing monitoring to confirm that counsel is providing effective representation to the accused. Such performance reviews would follow the
precedent of the STL, looking to an individual’s track record when practic272
ing in front of the ICC, and the ICCBA would consult with past clients to
consider client satisfaction and seek reviews from other members of the defense team, or even those working for the judiciary. Depending on the results of such reviews, the ICCBA could require individualized legal
coursework to address possible deficiencies. In the same vein as rule 57(G)
273
of the STL Rules of Procedure and Evidence, an amended regulation 76
of the ICC RC could provide that the ICCBA is authorized to conduct both
pre-appointment and ongoing performance reviews. ICC RC Regulation 76
could mimic STL Rule 57(G), which states that the Head of the Defense Office may impose sanctions on defense counsel if they fail to provide ade274
quate assistance. This recalibration would better allow the OPCD and
ICCBA to determine the professional caliber and set the professional culture
of the defense bar.
Notably, once membership in the ICCBA is mandatory, it would largely
be self-funding; since membership at the ICCBA would become mandatory,
membership fees should represent a significant source of the organization’s
275
funding. By placing the duty to represent the defense in a body that is not
subject to the funding pressures at the ICC, the ICC should be able to reallocate the funds currently spent on the internal representation of defense
matters to different divisions. This would make the overall proposal more
politically appealing.
Making ICCBA membership mandatory would also codify the
ICCBA’s institutional significance. While the OPCD would handle all the
defense-related legal matters for which it and the CSS are currently responsible in discussions with the Registry, the ICCBA could expand its repre-

271.
Starr, supra note 27, at 178.
272.
Special Trib. for Leb., STL-BD-2009-01-Rev.8, Rules of Procedure & Evidence,
rule 57(G) (2016) (mandating that, once counsel is appointed to represent a defendant, the
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whether the provided representation meets the governing standards of effectiveness).
273.
Id.
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275.
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sentative role to represent defense counsel interests in front of other organs
and committees of the Court. This representative association between the
ICCBA and the OPCD should be codified in regulation 77 of the ICC RC,
276
which created the OPCD. The regulation could provide that the OPCD
shall consult with the ICCBA, and the latter shall have responsibility to advocate for defense matters by lobbying the ICC’s rulemaking and administrative organs. Codification would give the ICCBA more institutional authority, which would be valuable when it deals with the other bodies of the
ICC.
This proposal is intended as a pragmatic remedy to the current impasse
between von Hegel’s ReVision Project and the OPCD. As such, this proposal cannot address all of the flaws currently present in the ICC’s system
of defense. Under this reorganization, there would still be no career-tracked
277
defense attorneys. After the pre-trial stage, defense counsel would still be
appointed on an ad hoc basis, even as OTP continues to use a staff attorney
278
model. However, list counsel would be further vetted by a required bar
exam along with ongoing, individualized performance assessments. This
compromise is responsive to budgetary concerns on the one hand—as it
would not require the OPCD to depart from the cost-effective ad hoc appointment structure—and competency concerns on the other, since the appointment of counsel would depend on both quantitative years of experience
and qualitative competency metrics.

V. Conclusion
The success of the ICC will not be determined by the number of its
convictions but rather by its adherence to fairness in the face of gross viola279
tions of international criminal law. It is in this pursuit of due process that
the professionalism and performance of defense counsel will be the “most
determinative dimension for evaluating the overall fairness of what is com280
monly considered ‘justice’ for grievous atrocities.” By pursuing the reformative measures outlined in this note, the ICC will begin to right some of
the wrongs of the ad hoc tribunals.
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their proceedings. Whether there are convictions or whether there are acquittals will not be the
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While the ReVision Project rightly strives to eliminate the bureaucratic
inefficiencies hampering the management of defense counsel, its proposals
would both further strip the defense of the independence that it needs and
denigrate the equality of arms. Relegating the defense to institutional insignificance is simply an untenable option given the Court’s permanence.
Turning a blind eye to defense matters risks obviation of the ICC’s legitimacy in both contemporary society and future generations. However, curing
defense counsel incompetence requires a serious attempt at bestowing the
OPCD with actual independence. Reconstituting the OPCD as an independent office under the Registry while codifying the ICCBA presents a costeffective, efficient, and pragmatic manner to do so the will improve the
Court’s “overall fairness” and protect the equality of arms.

